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DAMAGES ARISING IN A COMMERCIAL SETTING--Gates Rubber Co.

v. USM Corp., 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975)
In 1964, USM Corporation's predecessor in interest, FarrellBirmingham Company, Inc., delivered and installed a lead extrusion press at the Galesburg, Illinois plant of the Gates Rubber
Company (Gates).' The machine had been manufactured by and
purchased from Farrell pursuant to an oral agreement consummated in May of 1963.2 Subsequently, in July of 1968, the press3
became inoperable due to the failure of one of its integral parts.
After three years of fruitless negotiations with USM and insurance
adjusters, Gates instituted an action in federal district court 4 in
March of 1971 to recover consequential and property damages in
excess of $700,000.1 In its complaint the plaintiff alleged that the

negligent design, manufacture and installation of the machine had
6
proximately caused its failure.
The defendant moved for summary judgment 7 on the ground
Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 351 F. Supp. 329, 330 (S.D. Ill. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975).
2 Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 351 F. Supp. 329, 330, 333 (S.D. Il. 1972), rev'd on
other grounds, 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975).
3 Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 351 F. Supp. 329, 330 (S.D. I1. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975).
1 Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 508 F.2d 603, 605 (7th Cir. 1975). The suit was
brought in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970), which provides for federal
jurisdiction in civil actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000 and where
there is diversity of citizenship between the parties. Corporations are deemed to be citizens
of their state of incorporation. Id. § 1332(c).
5 See Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 508 F.2d 603, 605 (7th Cir. 1975). The alleged
damages consisted of $67,000 in actual property damage, and $650,000 because of interruption of production. id.
n Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 351 F. Supp. 329, 330 (S.D. Ill. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975). Plaintiffs original complaint also stated a cause of
action in strict liability in tort but this count was subsequently dropped by plaintiff. 351 F.
Supp. at 330-31. Plaintiff also amended its complaint to allege that defendant had fraudulently misrepresented facts pertaining to the design of the press, and thereby fraudulently
concealed the cause of action. Id. at 330, 337. The court found that no fraudulent concealment was present since defendant had not undertaken any affirmative acts or made any
misrepresentations sufficient to constitute fraudulent concealment. Id. at 338. Thus, the
plaintiff was unable to avail itself of ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 23 (Smith-Hurd 1966), which
provides that the statute of limitations is tolled until discovery of the concealment. See 351 F.
Supp. at 338.
Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 351 F. Supp. 329, 331 (S.D. Il. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975). The motion pertained not only to a defense on the
basis of the statute of limitations, but also to the theory that plaintiffs recovery on the
negligence count was limited only to actual and not consequential damage. 351 F. Supp. at
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that plaintiff's action, which was governed by Illinois law, was
barred by the controlling five-year statute of limitations, The
plaintiff, however, urged the court to apply the discovery rule, the
effect of which would be to hold that the action did not accrue
until the negligence could have been discovered with reasonable
diligence. 9
The trial court granted defendant's motion, rejecting plaintiff's contention that the discovery rule should be applicable in all
actions grounded in negligence.' 0 Rather, the court held that
under Illinois law the cause of action accrued at the time of installation of the machine and was thus barred by the limitations statute.' t In arriving at its conclusion, the court relied heavily upon a
331. The court considered a provision in the contractual agreement, which disclaimed any
liability on defendant's part for consequential damage, as effectively limiting defendant's
liability. Id. at 333-35. The court laid great emphasis upon section 2-719(3) of the UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE (codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-719(3) (Smith-Hurd 1963)), which
provides in part that "[clonsequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable." See 351 F. Supp. at 334-35. Furthermore, in areas
not controlled by the Code, Illinois law similarly allowed for limitation of consequential
damages. Id. at 334.
8 Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 351 F. Supp. 329, 335 (S.D. I1. 1972), rev'd on
other grounds, 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975). The applicable limitations statute in Illinois
provides that
actions . . . to recover damages for an injury done to property, real or personal.
shall be commenced within 5 years next after the cause of action accrued.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 16 (Smith-Hurd 1966). Vital to resolution of statute of limitations
problems, therefore, is a determination of when an action is deemed to have "accrued" under
Illinois law. For further analysis see note 11 infra.
See Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 351 F. Supp. 329, 336-37 (S.D. I11.
1972), rev'd on
other grounds, 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975). Ordinarily there is no need to employ the
discovery rule "because act, injury, and discovery, are simultaneous events." Davis, Tort
Liability and the Statutes of Limitation, 33 Mo. L. REV. 171, 188 (1968). Under those circumstances the time of accrual is obvious. However, where the injury is endured over a
period of time or is discoverable but not easily discernible, a defendant's potential liability
may be substantially limited. Id. at 188-89.
10 Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 351 F. Supp. 329, 337, 339 (S.D. 111.
1972), rev'd on
other grounds, 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975).
" Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 351 F. Supp. 329, 336-37, 339 (S.D. 111.
1972), rev'd
on other grounds, 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975). Determining when a cause of action "accrues"
in a negligence action has caused much litigation and different judicial treatment. The
general rule is that a cause of action accrues at the time the plaintiff may first institute suit.
See, e.g., Nelson v. Browning, 391 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Mo. 1965). In order to maintain a suit in
negligence four elements are necessary:
1. A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the actor to conform
to a certain standard of conduct . ...
2. A failure on his part to conform to the standard required ...
3. A reasonable close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting
injury. ...

4. Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another.
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 143 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted). For an
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line of Illinois appellate court decisions holding that the discovery
rule was inapplicable in actions for economic damage arising from
commercial transactions. t2 The court was unpersuaded that the
Illinois supreme court, which had narrowly applied the discovery
rule in three different contexts,' 3 had evinced a willingness to
4
apply the rule in all negligence actions.'
The Seventh Circuit, in Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp.15 also
refused to apply the discovery rule and held that the negligence
-action accrued when the defective press was installed at the plaintiffs plant. 16 The court was cognizant that it was faced with the
"almost equally unacceptable alternatives" of construing the statute
of limitations in a manner that would "either result in manifest
injustice to a particular litigant, or else make the limitations bar
virtually nonexistent to other litigants and potential litigants. 5'

7

To

example of the application of this standard see Sides v. Richard Mach. Works, Inc., 406 F.2d
445, 446 (4th Cir. 1969). See also Wolfswinkel v. Gesink, 180 N.W.2d 452, 456 (Iowa 1970).
Other courts, however, have held actions to accrue when the breach of legal duty has
occurred. See, e.g., Metal Structures Corp. v. Plains Textiles, Inc., 470 S.W.2d 93, 98 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1971). See also notes 26-33 infra and accompanying text.
Courts have also held that an action accrues when the last act creating liability has
occurred. See, e.g., Klondike Helicopters, Ltd. v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 334 F. Supp. 890,
892-93 (N.D. Il1. 1971), wherein the defendant was being sued for the negligent manufacture of a helicopter sold to the plaintiff. The court held that the last act creating liability was
the crash, and consequently, the action accrued at that time. Id. at 893. But see Gates Rubber
Co. v. USM Corp., 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975), in which the court decided that Klondike
properly stated the Illinois law but improperly applied it. Id. at 607 n.8. The court elaborated:
We believe the correct conclusion under Illinois law should have been that the
plaintiff was injured, for purposes of this property damage action, when he took
possession of the defectively manufactured helicopter.
Id.
12 Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 351 F. Supp. 329, 336 (S.D. 11. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975). See Board of Educ. v. Perkins & Will Partnership, 119
Ill. App. 2d 196, 197, 203, 255 N.E.2d 496, 497, 499 (1970); Wilson v. White Motor Corp.,
118 11. App. 2d 436, 438, 440, 254 N.E.2d 277, 278-79 (1969); Sabath v. Morris Handler
Co., 102 Ill.
App. 2d 218, 222, 228-29, 243 N.E.2d 723, 725, 729 (1968); Board of Educ. v.
Joseph J. Duffy Co., 97 111. App. 2d 158, 160-61, 240 N.E.2d 5, 6-7 (1968); Simoniz Co. v.J.
Emil Anderson & Sons, 81 Ill.
App. 2d 428, 430, 438, 225 N.E.2d 161, 162, 166 (1967).
'3 See Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hosp., 46 Il1. 2d 32, 40, 262 N.E.2d 450, 455 (1970)
(medical malpractice); Williams v: Brown Mfg. Co., 45 11. 2d 418, 432, 261 N.E.2d 305, 313
(1970) (strict products liability); Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Il1. 2d 54, 72-73, 250 N.E.2d 656,
665-66 (1969) (negligent surveyor).
14 See Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 351 F. Supp. 329, 336-37 (S.D. 11. 1972), rev'd
on other grounds, 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975).
15 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975).
16 Id. at 615. The court reversed the lower court's holding with respect to the fraudulent concealment issue. Id. at 615-16. The court did not reach the merits, but merely
determined that material differences of fact existed and, therefore, a dismissal on summary
judgment was improper. Id. at 616.
11Id. at 612.
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determine how the competing policies should be balanced, the
court, restricted to applying Illinois law and called upon to predict
18
how the Illinois supreme court would decide the novel issue,
evaluated the underlying implications of both the decisional and
statutory law of the state. From this analysis, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that the highest court of Illinois would attach greater
significance to achieving finality in commercial transactions than to
sustaining a plaintiff's action for economic injury, and thus would
refuse to apply the discovery rule in a commercial setting where
the parties were of equal bargaining strength. 9
The decision to apply the discovery rule is essentially one of
policy, 20 and entails a consideration of the traditional functions
served by statutes of limitations. 2 ' As articulated by Justice Jackson,
the underlying policy of these statutes of repose is
to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.2 2
Statutes of limitations, representing a legislative determination
that it is sound policy to preclude adjudication of stale claims, 23 are
Isld. at 605. The court lamented:
We regret that Illinois has not established a procedure, as has Indiana, which
would enable us to obtain definitive answers to the questions of Illinois law from the
tribunal with final authority to answer those questions.
Id. at 605 n.3.
19 Id. at 613-14.
21 See, e.g., Coumoulas v. Service Gas, Inc., 10 111.App. 3d 273, 293 N.E.2d 187 (1973),
where the court stated:
The question . . . [is] one of policy: whether, to avoid injustice, the applicable
limitations statute should begin to run when the plaintiff had in fact discovered that
he had suffered the injury or by the exercise of reasonable care should have
discovered it.
Id. at 275, 293 N.E.2d at 189. Coumoulas was decided subsequent to the Gates district court
opinion and was among the Illinois appellate court cases considered by the Seventh Circuit.
See 508 F.2d at 606 n.7.
21 The limitations statutes "represent a public policy about the privilege to litigate."
Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945). Their most basic function is
to produce speedy settlements . . . and to suppress those prejudices which may rise
up at a distance of time, and baffle every honest effort to counteract or overcome
them.
Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 351, 360 (1828). See also Developments in the. Law-Statutes of
Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185-86 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
22 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49
(1944).
23 The avoidance of stale claims is primarily a consideration of fairness to the defendant. Developments, supra note 21, at 1185. Indeed, as one court has noted: "[lIt is better for
the public that some rights be lost than that stale litigation be permitted." Thomas v. Richter,
88 Wash. 451, 456, 153 P. 333, 336 (1915). However, since statutes of limitations are capable
of producing great hardships,
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firmly entrenched in our system of jurisprudence. 24 Nevertheless,
they have generated a wide divergence of judicial opinion as to
when the limitation period should commence in an action predi25
cated upon negligence.
One established view in negligence actions has been that the
limitation period begins to run as soon as some legal right of the
plaintiff has been invaded. Illustrative of this approach is M. T.
Reed Construction Co. v. Jackson*PlatingCo., 26 in which the Supreme
Court of Mississippi applied the "legal injury" test. 27 In Reed, the

plaintiff sought to recover for the defendant's negligent construction of plaintiff's building when, more than six years after its
completion, the roof began to sag permitting water seepage. 28 The
court held that the action was barred by the six-year statute of
limitations on the theory that the limitation period ran from the
date of the original negligent construction 29 regardless of the amount
of damages then recoverable. Even though there was no discernible
damage within the statutory period, the plaintiff's suit was timebarred.3 0 The effect of this approach is, in essence, that the breach of
they should always be construed with reasonable strictness, and in favor of the
rights sought to be defeated thereby, so far as is consistent with their letter and
spirit.
1 H. WOOD, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS § 4, at 10 (4th ed. 1916).
24 The first statute of limitations on personal actions in the common law was the
Limitation Act of 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 16 (1623). Developments, supra note 21, at 1178. At present,
each of the fifty states has adopted limitations statutes in one form or another. See ittell, A
Comparison of the Statutes of Limitations, 21 IND. L.J. 23, 25 (1945). See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:14-1 et seq. (1952). Statutes of limitations "are found and approved in all systems of
enlightened jurisprudence." Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879). Cf. Hawkins v.
Barney's Lessee, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 457, 466 (1831) (upholding the constitutionality of limitations
statutes).
25 Commentators have not found a common ground for discussing the accrual problem. Compare Davis, supra note 9, at 187-88 with Recent Statutes, The Unique Negligence
Limitations Statute of Connecticut, 28 CONN. B.J. 346, 348-54 (1954). For a general discussion of
the various approaches taken in determining when a cause of action accrues see note 11
supra.
26 222 So. 2d 838 (Miss. 1969).
27 Id. at 840-41. Accord, e.g., Hooper v. Carr Lumber Co., 215 N.C. 308, 311, 1 S.E.2d
818, 820 (1939); Metal Structures Corp. v. Plains Textiles, Inc., 470 S.W.2d 93, 98 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1971). The application of this test has been necessitated in some states by specific
statutes. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5827 (1968). Under this statute "the claim
accrues at the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done regardless of the time
when damage results." Id. See Cree Coaches, Inc. v. Panel Suppliers, Inc., 23 Mich. App. 67,
70-71, 178 N.W.2d 101, 102-03 (1970).
28 222 So. 2d at 839.
19 Id. at 840-41.
30 Id.
at 839, 841. It is interesting that Reed specifically rejected the discovery rule because
its adoption "is solely within the province of the legislature" as a determination of public policy.
Id. at 840. But see note 69 infra.
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duty and damage elements vital to the maintenance of a negligence
suit are no longer perceived as two distinct elements but rather are
merged into one. 3 1 Accordingly, even if recoverable damages are
only nominal, 32 the action must be commenced within the prescribed
time of the initial negligent act.33
To avoid having an action deemed accrued at the time of the initial legal injury, the
plaintiff contended in Hargraves v. Brackett Stripping Mach. Co., 317 F. Supp. 676, 680
(E.D. Tenn. 1970), that he was deprived "of his rights in violation of due process" when the
statute of limitations was "construed as running from the date of the sale or the wrongful act
of the defendant." The court found, however, that no constitutional attack could be sustained unless the selection of the date when the action would begin to run could be shown to
be arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 682-83. The court further asserted that
the availability of proof . . . would not be an unreasonable concern for a legislative
body to have in mind in the enactment of a statute of limitations.
Id. at 683. The court concluded that "the date of the wrongful act" or sale "as the inception
date for the running of a statute of limitations" was not sufficiently arbitrary to violate the
due process clause. Id. Cf. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Minges, 473 F.2d 918, 922 (4th Cir.
1973).
31 See Jackson v. General Motors Corp., Oldsmobile Div., 223 Tenn. 12, 441 S.W.2d 482,
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 942 (1969), where the plaintiff was injured when her parked car rolled
down her driveway due to a defective parking gear and handbrake. 223 Tenn. at 13, 441
S.W.2d at 482. The Tennessee supreme court found that the cause of action accrued on the
date of the original breach of contract, that is, the date of sale. Id. at 17, 441 S.W.2d at 484.
The Sixth Circuit in Hodge v. Service Mach. Co., 438 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1971), interpreted
Jackson as holding that the breach of legal duty was that plaintiff received a defective
automobile and the damage was that "the plaintiff got less than he paid for." Id. at 349.
Thus, the two necessary elements merged on the date of sale and the cause of action accrued
on that date. Id. The view "that contract damages supply the essential 'damnum' of a
negligence action" to trigger the limitation period is unique. Recent Statutes, supra note 25,
at 351.
12 This seems to contradict the accepted view that nominal damages are insufficient to
maintain a negligence action. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 143 (4th ed. 1971). As
Dean Prosser points out:
Nominal damages, to vindicate a technical right, cannot be recovered in a negligence action, where no actual loss has occurred. The threat of future harm, not yet
realized, is not enough.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also C. MCCORMICK, THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 22, at 88-91 (1935),
where the author indicates that negligence without actual loss or damages is not actionable.
33 Where there is no breach of any contractual duty owed to the plaintiff, and his suit is for
consequential damages only, even the courts applying the "legal injury" test have held that the
cause of action does not accrue until damage occurs. See, e.g., Power v. Munger, 52 F. 705,
710-11 (8th Cir. 1892).
This approach is clearly demonstrated by contrasting two recent Georgia cases. In
Wellston Co. v. Sam N. Hodges, Jr. & Co., 114 Ga. App. 424, 151 S.E.2d 481 (1966), the
plaintiff was suing a contractor for negligent design and construction of its building. Id. at
425, 151 S.E.2d at 481-82. The court held the action to have accrued from the date the
negligent acts constituting the legal injury were committed. Id. at 426, 151 S.E.2d at 482. In
Hunt v. Star Photo Finishing Co., 115 Ga. App. 1, 153 S.E.2d 602 (1967), the court
evaluated an almost identical fact pattern, except that the plaintiff was not a party to the
building contract. Id. at 1-2, 153 S.E.2d at 603. Rather, the plaintiff moved into the building
as a subsequent lessee and was injured when the roof collapsed after the statute of limitations would have run if measured from the date of the negligent construction. Id. at 5-6, 153
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The more reasonable approach, exemplified by Rosenau v. City
of New Brunswick,3 4 is that actual damage is essential to a negligence
action, and that the statute does not commence running until such
damage occurs, regardless of any legal injury. 3 5 In Rosenau, plaintiffs, having sustained damage to their home when a water meter
installed fourteen years earlier broke, initiated suit against the
manufacturer for its negligence in manufacturing the meter, and
against the city for negligent maintenance.3 6 The trial court
granted the manufacturer's motion for summary judgment, con37
cluding that the action was precluded by the statute of limitations.
The appellate division reversed, and ultimately the New Jersey
supreme court determined that the manufacturer should be exposed to liability, notwithstanding the fact that the damage occur3z
red twenty-two years after the defective meter left its hands.
Underlying the court's holding was a recognition that New Jersey
courts have steadfastly held that a cause of action in negligence
"accrue[s] not when the negligence itself took place but when the
S.E.2d at 605. The court distinguished Wellston because in that case a legal injury occurred
long before the plaintiff was actually damaged. Id. at 5, 153 S.E.2d at 605. In Hunt, since the
plaintiff was a stranger to the contract, his cause of action did not accrue until he actually
sustained damages. Id. Accord, Welding Prods. v. S.D. Mullins Co., 127 Ga. App. 474, 476,
478, 193 S.E.2d 881, 883-84 (1972). This approach may have evolved out of the early
distinction between trespass and case. See Roberts v. Read, 104 Eng. Rep. 1070 (K.B. 1812).
34 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968).
3' Id.at 137-40, 238 A.2d at 172-74. This perception seems more justifiable than the "legal
injury" test because of the damage requirement in a negligence action. See Fields v. Napa Milling
Co., 164 Cal. App. 2d 442, 447-48, 330 P.2d 459, 462 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958). Cf White v.
Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273, 275-76, 18 A.2d 185, 186-87 (1941) (negligent installation of
lightning rod); Theurer v. Condon, 34 Wash. 2d 448, 454-55, 209 P.2d 311, 315 (1949)
(negligent installation of stove and oil tank). See also note 11 supra.
Some cases appear to be applying an actual damages rule, yet on closer inspection they
reveal an implication that might suggest otherwise. In Kitchener v. Williams, 171 Kan. 540,
236 P.2d 64 (1951), plaintiff was suing for personal injuries sustained as a result of a gas
explosion caused by a defective hot water heater. Id. at 540, 236 P.2d at 66. Although
apparently adopting an actual damages approach, the precise language of the court might
intimate a different conclusion:
We place the decision in this action on the ground and on the sole ground that had
the plaintiff brought the action any time before the explosion . . . he would have
met the defense that he had suffered no personal injury on account of negligence.
Id. at 553, 236 P.2d at 74. Thus, in a case where only property damage is present, the action
might be held to accrue at the time of the "legal injury." Cf. Barnes v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
406 F.2d 859, 862 (4th Cir. 1969), where the court held that a plaintiff who had sustained
injuries as a result of a fall from a defectively manufactured bicycle, had two causes of
action, one for property damage and one for personal injuries. Consequently, plaintiffs
cause of action for property damage accrued at the time of sale; his suit for personal
injuries, however, did not accrue until he was injured. Id.
36 51 N.J. at 134, 238 A.2d at 171.

37 Id. at 135, 238 A.2d at 171.
31 Id. at 140, 238 A.2d at 174.
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consequential injury or damage occurred. ' 39 Furthermore, the
court emphasized that to bar plaintiffs from suit before they had a
right to initiate it, "would offend common sense and justice. '40
Although Rosenau represents a more liberal approach to the
accrual problem than does the "legal injury" test, harshness may
nonetheless ensue from the application of statutes of limitations
under either approach. 4' Many jurisdictions, therefore, have
fashioned equitable devices to toll the statute42-a principal tool
being the discovery rule. Heretofore, courts have primarily utilized
the discovery rule in the areas of fraudulent concealment, 4 3 subsurface land injury, 4 4 and professional malpractice, 4 5 but have
been cautious to limit its scope to the particular facts of the case
46
before it.
11 Id. at 137, 238 A.2d at 172. Rosenau "[did] not rest upon the 'discovery' rule, since the
cause of action itself did not arise until the moment of injury." Rosenberg v. Town of N.
Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 195-96, 293 A.2d 662, 665 (1972).
40 51 N.J. at 140, 238 A.2d at 174.
4" There are many instances where the plaintiff has sustained actual damage and is
unaware of it. Some courts have applied the discovery rule under such circumstances to
alleviate the hardship to the plaintiff who would otherwise be barred from maintaining an
action. See, e.g., Smith v. Bell Tel. Co., 397 Pa. 134, 136, 153 A.2d 477, 478-79 (1959); Ruth
v. Dight, 75 Wash. 2d 660, 661, 453 P.2d 631, 632 (1969).
42 One such device has been the doctrine of "continuing tort." In a case where the
defendant has been exposed to risk over a period of time, courts have not found it easy to
pinpoint the time when the cause of action developed. See Recent Statutes, supra note 25, at
353-54. Courts have sought to alleviate the hardship of commencing the period at the date
of the initial injury by holding that the statute will be tolled until either the occurrence of harm,
the cessation of the wrong, or the discovery of the damage. Id. See, e.g., Dalrymple v. Brunswick
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 51 Ga.App. 754,754, 181 S.E. 597, 598 (1935); Hughes v. Eureka Flint
& Spar Co., 20 N.J. Misc. 314, 316, 26 A.2d 567, 568-69 (Mercer County Cir. Ct. 1939).
The discovery rule has sometimes been applied in cases where the tort is a continuing
one. See, e.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170-71 (1949). However, some jurisdictions
have refused to apply the discovery rule in this type of situation, and have adhered to the
continuing tort analysis. See Borgia v. City of N.Y., 12 N.Y.2d 151, 155-56, 187 N.E.2d 777,
778, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (1962).
4 See notes 47-50 infra and accompanying text.
4 See notes 51-57 infra and accompanying text.
5 See notes 58-62 infra and accompanying text.
4 See, e.g., Layton v. Allen, 246 A.2d 794, 799 (Del. 1968); Diamond v. New Jersey Bell
Tel. Co., 51 N.J. 594, 601, 242 A.2d 622, 626 (1968), where the court asserted:
We prefer to postpone discussion of the ultimate bounds of the discovery rule until
appropriate cases arise. The problem cannot yet be handled in purely abstract
terms.
But see Rosenberg v. Town of N. Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 196, 293 A.2d 662, 665 (1972),
indicating that the Diamond opinion, as well as New Market Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Fellows, 51
N.J. 419, 241 A.2d 633 (1968), another New Jersey discovery rule case, "clearly accept[ed]
the 'discovery' rule as having, if not universal, at least very wide application." See also Prince v.
Trustees of Univ. of Pa., 282 F.Supp.832,842-43 (E.D.Pa. 1968); Nielson v. Arizona Title Ins.
& Trust Co., 15 Ariz. App. 29, 30,485 P.2d 853,854 (1971); Basque v. Yuk Lin Liau, 50 Hawaii
397, 398-99, 441 P.2d 636, 637 (1968); Chrischilles v. Griswold, 260 Iowa 453, 462-63, 150
N.W.2d 94, 100 (1967).
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For example, in Schmucking v. Mayo4 7 the Minnesota supreme
court invoked the equitable discovery principle to permit the plaintiff to maintain a suit to recover for defendant's negligence in the
performance of a throat operation. 48 In allowing the suit predicated on the theory of fraudulent concealment, the court acknowledged that in actions based on fraud, the statute of limitations is
tolled until discovery of the fraud, and that this exception encompasses cases in which the defendant has fraudulently concealed the
existence of a cause of action. 4 9 The rationale for applying the
discovery rule was twofold. First, the court determined that the
statute of limitations was not intended to bar an action when the
plaintiff had been purposefully prevented from ascertaining the
existence of a valid claim, and second, that a defendant should not be
able to insulate himself from liability by concealing his own wrongdo50
ing.
The discovery rule has also been utilized in cases where the
plaintiff is unaware of damage to his property because the injury is
concealed beneath the surface of the ground.5 1 In Diamond v. New
Jersey Bell Telephone Co., 5 2 for example, the plaintiff instituted suit

against the telephone company for its negligent installation of an
underground conduit. 5 3 The carelessly performed installation had
183 Minn. 37, 235 N.W. 633 (1931).
Id. at 38, 41, 235 N.W. at 633-34.
49 Id.
at 39-41, 235 N.W. at 633-34. Many jurisdictions have statutory exceptions for
fraud which will toll the statute of limitations. See, e.g., N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 213:9
(McKinney 1972). Some statutes have extended this exception to include fraudulent concealment. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 23 (Smith-Hurd 1966). Injurisdictions where there
is no specific statutory exception, case law has evolved to the same effect. See, e.g., Kohler v.
Barnes, 123 N.J. Super. 69, 79, 301 A.2d 474, 479 (L. Div. 1973).
For an interesting example of judicial extension of a statutory exception for fraud to
include fraudulent concealment see De Vito v. New York Cent. Sys., 22 App. Div. 2d 600,
603, 257 N.Y.S.2d 895, 898-99 (1965), noted in 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 433 (1966). For general
discussions of fraud and fraudulent concealment in statute of limitations law see Dawson,
Fraudulent Concealment and Statutes of Limitation, 31 MICH. L. REV. 875 (1933); Dawson,
Undiscovered Fraud and Statutes of Limitation, 31 MICH. L. REV. 591 (1933).
11 183 Minn. at 40-41, 235 N.W. at 634. See also Partrick v. Groves, 115 N.J. Eq. 208,
211, 169 A. 701, 702 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934).
"' See, e.g., Smith v. Bell Tel. Co., 397 Pa. 134, 153 A.2d 477 (1959). Such cases often
deal with subterranean trespass. See, e.g., Lewey v. H. C. Fricke Coke Co., 166 Pa. 536, 542,
31 A. 261, 261 (1895), where the defendant had wrongfully removed coal from the plaintiff's land through jn underground mine. Since "[n]o amount of vigilance" by the plaintiff
would have enabled him to detect the defendant's wrongdoing, the court applied the
discovery rule. Id. at 547, 31 A. at 264. The court arrived at its conclusion by analogizing the
situation to one of fraud, where the discovery rule was the established theory. Id. at 543-45,
31 A. at 262-63. See also Cole v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, 322 F.2d 506, 510-11 (4th
Cir. 1963).
52 51 N.J. 594, 242 A.2d 622 (1968).
53 Id. at 596, 242 A.2d at 622-23.
47

48

19751

NOTES

damaged a sewer line which ultimately caused flooding on the
plaintiff's premises nine years after the installation.5 4 In determining whether the plaintiff's action should be time-barred or whether
equitable considerations warranted application of the discovery
rule, the Supreme Court of New Jersey weighed the defendant's
problem of defending a suit brought many years after its negligence against the harshness of barring a plaintiff who could not
have known of his cause of action. In striking the balance, the
court noted that "considerations of repose and fairness to defendants [should not] be ignored. ' 55 Nonetheless, fairness to the plaintiff under the circumstances "outweigh[ed] whatever dangers of
imposition exist[ed] in application of a discovery rule.

' 56

Further-

more, the court reasoned that the lapse of time could be as debilitating to a plaintiff in proving his case as it was to a defendant
57
in defending his.

The greatest impact of the discovery rule has been in the field
of medical malpractice. 5 8 Initially, the rule was applied in cases
where a foreign object had mistakenly been left inside the patient,
the effect of which was to toll the statute of limitations until the
object was discovered. 59 The modern trend, however, has been to
extend the utilization of this rule to encompass actions arising out
of misdiagnosis and mistreatment. 60 Motivating the courts to
employ the rule in this area has been a sensitivity to the plight of
innocent patients who have been physically harmed, since "the very
relationship of physician-patient, with its attributes of trust and
54 Id. at 596, 242 A.2d at 623. The plaintiff was suing for the damage to the sewer
pipes, not to the land from flooding. Id. at 597, 242 A.2d at 623. Therefore, the actual
damage occurred at the time of the initial installation.
55Id. at 600, 242 A.2d at 625.
56 Id.
1 Id. at 601, 242 A.2d at 625. See also Owens v. White, 342 F.2d 817, 819 (9th Cir.
1965).
" This area has produced much litigation and commentary. See, e.g., Lillich, The
Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York and Other Jurisdictions, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 339
(1962); Comment, Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York: Conflict and Confusion, 1
HOFSTRA L. REV. 276 (1973); Note, Medical Malpractice: A Survey of Statutes of Limitation, 3
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 597 (1969).
19 See, e.g., Spath v. Morrow, 174 Neb. 38, 43, 115 N.W.2d 581, 585 (1962); Fernandi v.
Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 450, 173 A.2d 277, 286 (1961); Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 292, 294,
154 A.2d 788, 793-94 (1959).
" See, e.g., Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hosp., 50 Hawaii 150, 154-55, 433 P.2d 220, 223 (1967);
Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hosp., 46 I1. 2d 32, 34-35, 40-41, 262 N.E.2d 450, 452, 455 (1970);
Frohs v. Greene, 253 Ore. 1, 3-4, 452 P.2d 564, 565 (1969). The discovery rule has been
adopted statutorily in many states to apply in medical malpractice situations. For a listing of
state statutes and cases adopting the discovery rule see Comment, supra note 58, at 292-94 &
n.73.
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confidence, often prevents [the injury's] prompt discovery."'" The
professional relationship concept has also served as one basis for
extending the discovery rule to apply in legal malpractice situations.62
The discovery rule, like any other equitable device, is not
applied mechanically. Courts have generally been cognizant of the
need to evaluate the competing policies before invoking the rule,
for it can be equally as harsh to subject a defendant to liability for
an indefinite time as it is to bar a plaintiff before he is aware that
he has been injured. 63 The Gates court, appreciative of the necessity of weighing the conflicting interests, attempted to discern how
the balance would be struck by the Illinois supreme court. To do
so, it endeavored to resolve the apparent dichotomy between the
Illinois appellate court decisions and those supreme court decisions
in which the discovery rule had been applied.
The most influential of the appellate court opinions, Simoniz
Co. v.

J. Emil Anderson & Sons, 64 was the starting point in the

6" Lillich, supra note 58, at 365 (footnote omitted). The author also points out that in
order for a patient to discover his physician's negligence, he usually must see another doctor,
"an occurrence the physician-patient relationship tends to discourage." Id. (footnote omitted).
62 "Because of the unique ethical standards adopted by, or imposed upon the legal
profession," attorneys are susceptible to malpractice suits based on breach of a fiduciary duty
to their clients. Haughey, Lawyers' Malpractice:A Comparative Appraisal, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW.
888, 891 (1973). Consequently, where an attorney has breached this duty, the discovery rule
has sometimes been applied to alleviate harshness to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Neel v. Magana,
Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 189, 491 P.2d 421, 429, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837,
845 (1971), noted in 24 HASTINGS L.J. 795 (1973); Edwards v. Ford, 279 So. 2d 851, 853 (Fla.
1973); Mumford v. Staton, Whaley & Price, 254 Md. 697, 714, 255 A.2d 359, 367 (1969). See
also Note, The Commencement of the Statute of Limitations in Legal Malpractice Actions-The Need
for Re-evaluation: Eckert v. Schaal, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 230 (1967). Some Jurisdictions have
adopted the discovery rule statutorily for legal malpractice. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 95.11 (4)(a) (Supp. 1975-76) (all professional malpractice).
The discovery rule has also been applied in other professional malpractice areas,
including accountants, stockbrokers, insurance agents, title companies and escrow holders.
See Note, 18 N.Y.L.F. 482, 485 n.15 (1972). See also cases cited in Gates, 508 F.2d at 610-11
n. 16. Many jurisdictions have also adopted statutes which set an outside date for bringing an
action against architects, engineers, building contractors and designers. Comment, Limitation
of Action Statutes for Architects and Builders-Blueprintsfor Non-action, 18 CATH. U.L. REV. 361,
361 & n.1 (1969).
63 Cf. Note, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 652, 657 (1968). The Ninth Circuit has suggested several
criteria which "would temper application of the discovery doctrine by hedging it with
equitable considerations." Owens v. White, 342 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1965). The factors
that might be considered are
the nature of the alleged injury, the relative difficulty of proving the wrong as
contrasted with rebutting that proof, the availability of witnesses and records ...
and the inherent difficulty of discovering certain wrongs.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Accord, Grey v. Silver Bow County, 149 Mont. 213, 216-18, 425 P.2d
819, 821 (1967).
64 81 Ill. App. 2d 428, 225 N.E.2d 161 (1967).

1975]

NOTES

court's analysis. In Simoniz, a landowner sought to recover for the
negligent construction of a building whose roof had collapsed nine
years after its completion. 6 5 Determining that the cause of action
accrued at the time of defendant's negligence, the court barred the
plaintiff's claim, expressly refusing to apply the "know or ought to
know" rule, as the discovery rule is sometimes called.6 6 Underlying
the court's decision was an awareness that after it had previously
refused to apply the rule in Mosby v. Michael Reese Hospital,6 7 a
medical malpractice action, the legislature reacted by enacting a
discovery rule to control such actions. 6 8 The Simoniz court reasoned
that the determination to apply the rule in cases dealing with
69
property damage should similarly be left to the legislature.
The Gates court found that the reasoning advanced in Simoniz
had been rejected by subsequent Illinois supreme court decisions,
65 id. at 430, 225 N.E.2d at 162.
66 Id. at 438, 225 N.E.2d at 166.

67 49 111. App. 2d 336, 342, 199 N.E.2d 633,636 (1964). In Mosby, a surgical needle was left
in a patient's body during an operation, and remained there undiscovered for four years. Id. at
337, 199 N.E.2d at 634. Upon discovery, the patient brought suit, but the court held the action
barred by the two-year limitation period on personal injuries. Id. at 337, 342, 199 N.E.2d at 634,
636.
68 81 111. App. 2d at 435-36, 225 N.E.2d at 165. Mosby has been criticized as "fathering"
inequitable results such as Simoniz. Petersen, The Undiscovered Cause of Action and the Statute of
Limitations: A Right Without a Remedy in Illinois, 58 ILL. B.J. 644, 646 (1970).
'9 81 II1. App. 2d at 438, 225 N.E.2d at 166. All of the appellate court decisions
considered by Gates solidly upheld this view. See 508 F.2d at 606 & n.7. However, the more
enlightened view has been that the application of the discovery rule is a matter for the
courts. See Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 433-34, 248 N.E.2d 871,
874-75, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, 28-29 (1969); Berry v. Branner, 245 Ore. 307, 313, 421 P.2d 996,
999 (1966). In Morgan v. Grace Hosp., Inc., 149 W. Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156 (1965), the
court admitted that changing the length of the limitation period was purely a legislative
decision. Id. at 790, 144 S.E.2d at 160. However, the court asserted its own function-to
construe the meaning of the term accrual--a "function [that] is ... peculiarly for the judicial
branch of government." Id.
Courts, on occasion, have attempted to circumvent the clear legislative intent by construing a statute in such a manner as to reach a desired result. See, e.g., Allison v. Missouri Power
& Light Co., 59 S.W.2d 771 (Mo. Ct. App. 1933) (construing Mo. REV. STAT. § 860 (1929), as
amended, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.100 (1952)). See also Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198
F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J., dissenting), in which Judge Frank urged that the
court should alleviate the harshness of the plain language of CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 8324
(1949), as amended, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (1960), which provided that a cause of

action in "negligence ... shall be brought but within one year from the.date of the act or
omission complained of." Judge Frank animatedly asserted that
[elxcept in topsy-turvy land, you can't die before you are conceived, or be
divorced before ever you marry, or harvest a crop never planted, or burn down a
house never built, or miss a train running on a non-existent railroad.
198 F.2d at 823 (footnotes omitted). Indeed, in Judge Frank's view "'it is inconceivable that
[plaintff] should be barred by lapse of time before the time when she could have instituted
[her] suit.' " Id. at 826 (emphasis by the court) (footnote omitted) (quoting from Foley v.
Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 38, 68 A.2d 517, 535 (1949)).
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particularly Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hospital,70 a medical malpractice action in which the court applied the discovery rule. 71 The
effect of Lipsey, in determining that it was not solely within the
ambit of legislative power to apply the rule, 7 2 was to undermine the
precedential value of both Simoniz and Mosby. As such, the court in
Gates concluded that the line of appellate court decisions which had
all substantially relied on Simoniz should not be dispositive of the
issue presented in Gates.73 Nevertheless, the court observed that
[t]he fact that the reasoning of Simoniz and its progeny is unacceptable does not, however, lead inexorably to the conclusion
that the [Illinois] Supreme
Court would have reached a different
74
result in those cases.
The basis for this view was that Illinois' highest court had not
adopted a "discovery rule of general applicability" in any of the
v.
cases that did employ the rule75-Rozny v. Marnul,76 Williams
78
Brown Manufacturing Co., 7 7 or Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hospital.
In Rozny, the first case in which the Illinois supreme court
utilized the discovery rule, the plaintiffs, as homeowners, sought to
recover damages from a surveyor who had negligendy prepared
the plat commissioned by the building contractor. 7 9 A jury verdict
rendered for the plaintiffs was appealed by the defendant, who
contended that he should incur no liability for two reasons. First,
he asserted that the plaintiffs' suit should have been barred by the
statute of limitations and, second, that the plaintiffs had not stated
a ground for relief for tortious misrepresentation because they
were not in privity with the surveyor.8 0 The court determined that
lack of privity would not operate as a defense to the suit, but more
importantly, that plaintiffs' cause of action should be considered as
accruing on the date they discovered defendant's negligence. 8' The
70

46 Ill. 2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970).

71 508 F.2d at 608.
72 46 Il1. 2d at 38-40, 262 N.E.2d at 454-55.
73 508 F.2d at 608.
I4
Id.

I- Id. North Carolina has statutorily adopted the discovery rule with a ten year outside
limit for all personal injury and property damage claims. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(b)
(Supp. 1974).
76 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969).
77 45 I11. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970).
78 46 111.2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970).
71 43 I1. 2d at 56-57, 250 N.E.2d at 657.
1o See id. at 62, 68, 250 N.E.2d at 660, 663.
11 Id. at 60-62, 72-73, 250 N.E.2d at 659-60, 665-66. The discovery rule has been
extended to include surveyors in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Mattingly v. Hopkins, 254 Md.

1975]

NOTES

court viewed the resolution of the limitation accrual problem as a
balance between the surveyor's difficulty in defending this type of
suit and the plaintiffs' blameless ignorance in not knowing of the
defect in the survey-a balance ultimately resolved in favor of the
plaintiffs. 2 The primary significance of Rozny, however, rests in
the test articulated by the court to govern the rule's application:
[W]here the passage of time does little to increase the problems
of proof, the ends of justice are served by permitting plaintiff to
sue within the statutory period computed from the time at which
he knew or should have known of the existence of the right to
83
sue.

Judge Stevens, speaking for the Gates court, did not apply
these prescribed guidelines. Rather, he placed reliance on the fact
that Rozny was vitally concerned with avoiding " 'potential "liability
in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." ' ".84 He concluded, therefore, that the Rozny court
would be reluctant to apply the discovery rule in the arms length
commercial circumstances of the Gates case.8 5 This appears to be a
misreading of Rozny. Although the Illinois supreme court was concerned in Rozny with overextending potential liability, it was only in
the context of whether a third party could collect for economic
s6
losses arising from defendant's tortious misrepresentations.
Thus, Gates never really addressed the essence of the considerations suggested in Rozny, for it failed to ask and answer the vital
question: Is the burden upon the defendant so onerous, because of
the passage of time, that it is inequitable to apply the discovery
rule, despite the fact that the plaintiff could not know of his right
to sue until long after the negligent act occurred?17 Rather, the
court merely determined that nothing in Rozny suggested that the
Illinois supreme court would extend application of the discovery
8
rule to a commercial transaction such as Gates.
88, 96, 253 A.2d 904, 908 (1969); New Market Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Fellows, 51 N.J. 419,
425-26, 241 A.2d 633, 637 (1968); Kundahl v. Barnett, 5 Wash. App. 227, 231, 486 P.2d
1164, 1167 (1971). Some states have enacted special statutes applying the discovery rule to
2
surveyors. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 4g (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974).
812 43 Ill. 2d at 70, 72-73, 250 N.E.2d at 664-66.
83 Id. at 70, 250 N.E.2d at 664.
14 508 F.2d at 615 (quoting from Rozny v. Marnul, 43 ill. 2d 54, 63, 250 N.E.2d 656,
661 (1969) (quoting from Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174
N.E. 441, 444 (1931)).
11 508 F.2d at 615.
8 See 43 Ill. 2d at 62-68, 250 N.E.2d at 660-63.
8 Cf. text accompanying note 84 supra.
18 508 F.2d at 615.
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The court also concluded that neither Lipsey nor Williams, an
action grounded in strict liability in tort,8 9 was persuasive authority
for utilizing the rule in Gates.9 0 The Gates court distinguished both
cases, perceiving that the supreme court had limited its holdings to
the narrow issues confronting it, primarily because the cases had
both involved personal, rather than economic injuries.9 1 Additionally, in Williams, a primary justification for employing the discovery
rule was to avoid " 'emasculat[ing] much of the consumer protection
afforded by' " the Illinois courts to injured parties.9 2 Accordingly,
the Gates court reasoned that an action based on common law
negligence did not present as compelling a reason for employing
the discovery rule as did Williams. 93 Furthermore, Gates gave little
consideration to Williams' balancing of the evidentiary problems of
94
the defendant against the harshness to the plaintiff.
Having analyzed the relevant Illinois case law, the Gates court
attempted to balance some of the factors it felt the Illinois supreme
court would deem important. It recognized that a shorter statute of
limitations would militate in favor of the discovery rule because of
the increased possibility that a plaintiff would be barred before he
could possibly know of his damage. 9 5 The court also noted that it
would be anomalous to extend potential liability in property dam" In strict products liability actions the statute of limitations in most cases will run from
the time of the injury. See, e.g., Rivera v. Berkeley Super Wash, Inc., 44 App. Div. 2d 316,
325, 354 N.Y.S.2d 654, 663 (1974); Holifield v. Setco Indus., Inc., 42 Wis. 2d 750, 754-55,
168 N.W.2d 177, 179-80 (1969). See also TENN. COnE ANN. § 28-304 (Supp. 1974). Where
inequity to the plaintiff might ensue in a strict products liability action, the discovery rule has
sometimes been applied. See, e.g., Alabama Great S.R.R. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 467 F.2d
679, 684 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying Mississippi law); Hornung v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc.,
317 F. Supp. 183, 185 (D. Mont. 1970).
90 508 F.2d at 614.
91 Id.

Id. at 610 (emphasis by the court) (quoting from Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill.
2d 418, 432, 261 N.E.2d 305, 313 (1970)).
93 See 508 F.2d at 614.
" The Williams court asserted that since the
defendant is in the better position to know the condition of his product when it left
his control, adequate safeguards exist against injustices arising from the passage of
• .. time.
45 III. 2d at 432, 261 N.E.2d at 313. Gates recognized that the discovery rule may be applied
where "evidence relating to the critical issue on which plaintiff has the burden of proof is
generally in defendant's control." 508 F.2d at 610. Yet, it gave little consideration to this
perception in the context of commercial transactions.
95 508 F.2d at 612-13. The court noted, however, that "the probability of injustice
resulting from the failure to discover meritorious claims unquestionably diminishes as the
statutory period increases." Id.
92

1975]

NOTES

743

age actions for a period greater than the legislature had provided
96
for medical malpractice actions.
Gates additionally analogized the limitation accrual problem in
negligence cases to breach of contract situations. Under the Uniform Commercial Code9 7 the period of limitation runs from the
time of the breach, whether or not the complainant had any knowledge thereof, the rationale being " 'that commercial interests are
best served by quickly bringing finality to commercial transactions.' ",98 The court found that under Illinois decisions not covered
by the Code there existed a societal "interest in having definite rules
which enable businessmen to allocate foreseeable risks of loss." 9 9
The Seventh Circuit was thus persuaded that the supreme
court's opinions in favor of providing an injured party with a
remedy was outweighed by the policy of providing certainty and
finality in commercial transactions. 0 0 Indeed, the possibility that
negligence might occur was regarded as a foreseeable commercial
risk that could be provided for by contract provisions or insurance
where the parties are of equal bargaining strength."0 '
9 See id. at 613. The court reasoned that until a claim is at least five years old there is
no need for a discovery rule. Since the rule would allow an action to be brought for five
years subsequent to discovery, potential liability would be extended for over ten years. Id.
Therefore, application of the discovery rule in this situation would provide greater protection than in medical malpractice. Id. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (Smith-Hurd 1966),
which provides for a discovery rule with an outside cutoff date of ten years after the date of
the operation or treatment.
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-725 (codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-725

(Smith-Hurd 1963)). For a unique example of application of the discovery rule to a breach
of implied warranty case see Puretex Lemon juice, Inc. v. S. Riekes & Sons, 351 S.W.2d 119
(Tex. Civ. App. 1961), noted in 41 TEXAS L. REV. 321 (1962).
98

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-725, Comment (2) (Smith-Hurd 1963) (quoting from W.

HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES 40 (1958)).

99 508 F.2d at 613. The court relied on Cerny-Pickas & Co. v. C. R. Jahn Co., 7 I1. 2d
393, 131 N.E.2d 100 (1955). In Cerny-Pickas, the court interpreted a lease provision to
exempt a lessee from liability for a fire caused by his negligence. Id. at 396-98, 131 N.E.2d at
103. The court asserted that
[t]here are areas of the law in which the distinctions between liability in contract
and liability in tort may be significant, despite their remote and accidental origin.
We are not satisfied, however, that such distinctions are relevant in determining the
meaning to be given to words used by laymen in defining their rights and obligations.
Id. at 397, 131 N.E.2d at 103. The Gates court used this language as justification for
concluding that the Illinois supreme court would consider the underlying commercial
transaction as more significant than whether the suit was predicated upon a tort or contract
theory. 508 F.2d at 614. However, in Cerny-Pickas, the statute of limitations was not even in
issue. Consequently, it is not valid precedent for determining whether a distinction between
tort and contract is significant in assessing when an action accrues for statute of limitations
purposes. See also note 104 infra.
100 508 F.2d at 613.
101 Id.
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Thus, the Gates court decided that
the Illinois Supreme Court would regard the theoretical basis for
the claim, whether advanced in tort or contract, as less significant
0 2
than the nature of the'transaction which gave rise to

it.'

This led the court to conclude that there was not "a sufficient
difference between the two theoretical bases of recovery to justify
the discovery rule in one situation but not the other."' t0 3 This
reasoning is questionable because it fails to take into account that
tort and contract are two distinct causes of action, and should be
treated accordingly in the context of statute of limitations accrual
problems." 4 The major shortcoming of Gates, however, is that it
did not effectively deal with the underlying rationale behind statutes of limitations-protection of the defendant from having to
defend a suit where the passage of time has made the problems of
proof too onerous. Gates fails to balance the hardship to the defendant with the adversity to the plaintiff created by barring him
before he has any knowledge of his cause of action-the approach
0 5
suggested by Rozny.1
The responsibility ultimately rests with the legislatures to formulate rules which properly balance the equities. In the interim,
courts will have to deal with the problems of extending potential
liability to a broad range of commercial interests. Many factors may
influence their decisions, including the difficulty in discovering the
negligence, whether personal injuries are involved, and the useful
life of the product.10 6 But justice is best served by utilizing the
102 Id. at 614.
103 Id.
104 It has long been recognized that tort and contract are separate theories of recovery
and should be treated as such. W. PROSSER, SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF TORTS 410-11
(1953). As Dean Prosser notes:
"Where the duty has its roots in contract, the undertaking to observe due care may
be implied from the relationship, and should it be the fact that a breach of the
agreement also constitutes such a failure to exercise care as amounts to a tort, the
plaintiff may elect, as the common-law authorities have it, to sue in case or in
assumpsit."
Id. at 410 (quoting from Flint & Walling Mfg. Co. v. Beckett, 167 Ind. 491,498, 79 N.E. 503,
505 (1906)). There is some authority that the Code statute of limitations applies in personal
injury actions arising out of breach of contract. See Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 413
Pa. 415, 419, 197 A.2d 612, 614 (1964). But cf. Matlack, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp.
972, 976 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
In strict products liability actions it has been held that the Code statute of limitations
does not apply. See Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 157, 305 A.2d 412, 427 (1973).
Cf. Nelson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1120, 1123 (D.N.H. 1970) (breach
of warranty and strict liability distinguished).
'o' See text accompanying note 83 supra.
06 The useful life of the product concept has been criticized as being "exceptionally
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discovery rule to prevent barring a blamelessly ignorant plaintiff
where the defendant's ability to defend against his own negligent
conduct is not impaired by the hiatus between the negligent act
and its discovery.
Ira E. Weiner
vague and probably unworkable." Peterson, Civil Procedure, 1969 Annual Survey of Michigan
Law, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 501, 510 (1970).

